Conferences
December 2009
Session VI-2 Financial Information & Accounting (18/12/2009 à 11h00)
E. de Bodt
Accounting lighthouse in share market dynamics: a theoretical model of share price formation with dual informational structure
Auteurs : Yuri Biondi (CNRS - Preg CRG, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris); Pierpaolo Giannoccolo (University of Bologna, Dept. of Economics)
!!Email!! : yuri.biondi@polytechnique.edu
Intervenants : Yuri Biondi (CNRS - Preg CRG, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris)
Rapporteurs : Buhiu Qiu
The discovery and processing of firm-specific information is expected to play a role in the making of individual expectations and related financial decisions. The information set available to share market investors is then jointly composed by market and firm-specific (non-market) information. From one side, the accounting system provides collective signals of firm-specific information. From another side, the price system provides collective signals of market information. Both institutional devices are significant for the formation of aggregate share market prices over time. In particular, the accounting system complements the price system by constituting a lighthouse in the amazing dynamics of the share market through hazard, learning and interaction. This theoretical framework applies here to provide an heuristic model of share price formation with such dual informational (and institutional) structure. Implications and recommendations are derived for the concept and occurrence of speculative bubbles, and the cyclical effects of accounting information on share market evolution.
The Strategic Interaction between Committing and Detecting Fraudulent Misreporting
Auteurs : Buhui Qiu (Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University); Steve L. Slezak (College of Business, University of Cincinnati)
!!Email!! : buhuiqiu@gmail.com
Intervenants : Buhui Qiu (Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University)
Rapporteurs : Catherine Refait-Alexandre
The paper considers an agency model of fraudulent misreporting which implies a rich set of relationships between the commission of fraud, the observation or detection of fraud, economic performance, and the compensation policy of the firm. The paper develops a number of testable empirical implications and highlights several interesting phenomena, including implications on exogenous variables that can cause an increase in the amount of fraud committed but a decrease in the amount of fraud being observed (and visa versa). Thus, empirical studies that seek to identify the firm or managerial characteristics associated with the commission of fraud cannot infer a relationship by simply examining how the amount of observed fraud varies with these characteristics. In addition, the paper also shows that an increase in an industry’s growth potential can cause that industry to fall from a high-productivity pooling equilibrium (with high levels of incentive compensation and effort and, as a result, many high-productivity firms) to the lower-productivity mixed-strategy equilibrium (with lower levels of incentive compensation and effort and, as a result, fewer high-productivity firms), resulting in a drop in economic performance.
Is corporate disclosure necessarily desirable? A survey
Auteurs : Etienne Farvaque (Université de Lille 1, Faculté des Sciences Économiques et Sociales); Céline Gainet (IAE Paris); Catherine Refait-Alexandre (CRESE, Université de Franche-Comté); Dhafer Saïdane (Lille School of Management Research Center)
!!Email!! : catherine.refait-alexandre@univ-fcomte.fr
Intervenants : Catherine Refait-Alexandre (CRESE, Université de Franche-Comté)
This article reviews the recent literature on the consequences of disclosure for listed firms. Though some studies show that disclosure is desirable for shareholders because it reduces the cost of capital, and increases the value created, others provide more mixed results. The conclusion on the collective advantages is even less convincing; it is not at all certain that disclosure can improve the stability of financial markets. To explain these results, it is necessary to invoke the costs and pernicious effects of disclosure. Disclosing information is expensive: because of the communication and audit costs, strategic information given to competitors and because disclosure can increase managers’ suboptimal behavior. But corporate disclosure also generates informational costs, because it is not certain that it improves the information held by third parties. Indeed, a firm can disclose information that is false, manipulated, too complex or too extensive. In this case, disclosure can increase information asymmetry between agents. Finally, disclosure can reduce actors’ incentives to look for information about the firm; it can reduce the knowledge that the market has at its disposal. Disclosure can therefore lead to an illusion of knowledge, increasing the instability of the financial markets instead of reducing it.
Retourner au planning de la conférence