Auteurs : CARPENTIER Cécile & SURET Jean-Marc (Laval University); L’HER Jean-François (La Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec)
Intervenants : CARPENTIER Cécile (Laval University) Cecile.email@example.com
In Canada, a venture stock market lists micro-capitalization firms that are at a pre-revenue stage, and competes with both formal and informal venture capital (VC). This market provides a higher rate of return and is able to provide seven times more new listings to the main exchange than the VC market. We do not evidence post-graduation underperformance, and indeed, new listings on a main exchange can succeed even if they originate from a public venture market. Our results do not support the theoretical arguments that confer specific advantages on the VCs with regard to screening, monitoring and exiting new ventures.
Auteurs : DE BODT Eric; LOBEZ Frédéric; Jean-Christophe STATNIK (Lille School of Management)
Intervenants : Jean-Christophe STATNIK (Lille School of Management) firstname.lastname@example.org
Trade Credit is a major source of financing. Over the past decade, it has represented more than 20% of the total assets of US listed firms. Different arguments have been suggested in the academic literature to explain why there is a strong industry pattern to trade credit usage (including the nature of the firm’s assets, the degree of liquidity of the firm’s inputs, and the degree of competition among suppliers), but little is known about the factors underlying the variance of trade credit usage among firms in the same industry. We argue that trade credit can be used by firms as a signal of quality. Our theoretical predictions are empirically verified using a large sample of US firms observed during the 1977−2005 period.
Auteurs : BELOT François (Université Paris-Dauphine)
Intervenants : BELOT François (Université Paris-Dauphine) email@example.com
In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. This paper investigates the effects of such agreements on the valuation of firms. I use a sample of French firms that is well suited for my analysis insofar as French law requires the disclosure of the shareholder agreements’ clauses. In line with previous literature, a negative relationship between firm value and the dispersion of voting rights across major shareholders is observed. However, the existence of a shareholder agreement tends to offset this negative effect. This countervailing effect is more pronounced when a “concerted action” provision is in force and/or the contracting shareholders are of the same type. Shareholder agreements thus appear as efficient coordination mechanisms rather than expropriation mechanisms.Retourner au planning de la conférence