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Session III-2 International Finance (17/12/2009 à 14h30)

D. Isakov

The Political Economy of State Residual Ownership in Privatized Firms: Evidence from Emerging Markets

Auteurs : Narjess Boubakri (American University of Sharjah, UAE); Jean-Claude Cosset (HEC Montreal); Omrane Guedhami (University of South Carolina); Walid Saffar (American University of Beyruth)

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Intervenants : Omrane Guedhami (University of South Carolina)

Rapporteurs : Dusan Isakov

To investigate the control structure of newly privatized firms, we use a unique database of 221 privatized firms operating in 27 emerging countries over the 1980-2001 period. Specifically, we examine the determinants of residual state ownership after privatization over a window of up to six years after divestiture. We find that the residual state ownership is largely influenced by the size of the firm, the level of investor protection and the extent of corruption in the country. Controlling for the political institutions in place shows that government tenure (stability), the political system and political cohesion are important determinants of the residual state ownership in newly privatized firms. This result confirms that privatization is politically shaped and constrained by a dynamic that will differ between countries.

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Can Corporate Issuers Earn From Conformity among Institutional Investors? Evidence from International Bonds

Auteurs : Massimo Massa (Finance department, INSEAD); Alminas Zaldokas (Finance department, INSEAD)

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Intervenants : Alminas Zaldokas (Finance department, INSEAD)

We study whether bondownership by peers affects international institutional investor demand of bonds and what implications this relationship has for the prices of new bond issues and the decisions of firms to issue abroad. We use detailed US corporate bond ownership data and show that the demand of US bonds by international institutions is positively affected by bondownership of other investors from the same country. International ownership is related to higher yield spreads for the domestic issues and to lower offering yield spreads for the international issues. Firms would gain by issuing in countries where its bondholders are located as their peers provide additional demand. Indeed, we observe that firm issuance decisions are affected by the previous composition of its bondownership. The results are strongest for the firms that have higher deviation of analyst forecasts and lower ratings.

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Foreign bank entry and credit allocation in emerging markets

Auteurs : Hans Degryse (CentER,Tilburg University, and CESif); Olena Havrylchyk (CEPII); Emilia Jurzyk (International Monetary Fund); Sylwester Kozak (National Bank of Poland)

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Intervenants : Olena Havrylchyk (CEPII)

Rapporteurs : Alminas Zaldokas

We employ a unique data set containing bank-specific information to explore how foreign bank entry determines credit allocation in emerging markets. We investigate the impact of the mode of foreign entry – greenfield and takeover – on banks’ portfolio allocation to borrowers with different degrees of informational transparency, as well as by maturities and currencies. The impact of foreign entry on credit allocation may stem from the superior performance of foreign entrants (“performance hypothesis”), or reflect borrower informational capture (“portfolio composition hypothesis”). Our results are broadly in line with the theoretical models underpinning the portfolio composition hypothesis, showing that borrower informational capture determines bank credit allocation. In particular, we find that foreign banks that enter via greenfield investment devote a higher share of their portfolios to transparent borrowers, lend more at shorter maturity and in foreign currency. We find few differences between the portfolio composition of takeover and domestic private banks. We also document that there is a significant convergence over time between foreign and domestic banks in terms of groups of borrowers they lend to, while there is no convergence in terms of maturity and currency. Finally, we do not find any impact of bank ownership and mode of entry on lending rates.

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